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People frequently feel anxious. Although prior research has extensively studied how feeling 
anxious shapes intrapsychic aspects of cognition, much less is known about how anxiety affects 
interpersonal aspects of cognition. Here, we examine the influence of incidental experiences of 
anxiety on perceptual and conceptual forms of perspective taking. Compared with participants 
experiencing other negative, high-arousal emotions (i.e., anger or disgust) or neutral feelings, 
anxious participants displayed greater egocentrism in their mental-state reasoning: They were 
more likely to describe an object using their own spatial perspective, had more difficulty 
resisting egocentric interference when identifying an object from othersÕ spatial perspectives, and 
relied more heavily on privileged knowledge when inferring othersÕ beliefs. Using both 
experimental-causal-chain and measurement-of-mediation approaches, we found that these 
effects were explained, in part, by uncertainty appraisal tendencies. Further supporting the role of 
uncertainty, a positive emotion associated with uncertainty (i.e., surprise) produced increases in 
egocentrism that were similar to anxiety. Collectively, the results suggest that incidentally 
experiencing emotions associated with uncertainty increase reliance on oneÕs own egocentric 
perspective when reasoning about the mental states of others. 
Keywords: anxiety, egocentrism, emotion, perspective taking, theory of mind 
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Anxious and Egocentric: How Specific Emotions Influence Perspective Taking 
To navigate the social world successfully, people must actively reason about what others 
see, know, believe, and desire. This capacity to consider othersÕ mental states, commonly 
referred to as Òtheory of mind,Ó is essential for communication and social coordination. Without 
direct access into othersÕ minds, however, people frequently use intuitive strategies to guide their 
inferences about othersÕ mental states. One such strategy entails consulting the contents of oneÕs 
own mind (Goldman, 2006; Mitchell, 2009). Although oneÕs own egocentric perspective can be a 
good proxy for making social predictions (Dawes, 1989; Hoch, 1987), people often rely too 
heavily on accessible self-knowledge during mental-state reasoning (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2007; 
Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Sommerville, Bernstein, & Meltzoff, 2013). By failing to adjust for 
ways in which othersÕ perspectives might differ from their own (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & 
Gilovich, 2004; Tamir & Mitchell, 2013), they set the stage for potential misunderstanding and 
conflict (Ross & Ward, 1996). 
Many factors can affect the extent of egocentrism during mental-state reasoning; these 
include characteristics of both targets and perceivers. For instance, egocentrism tends to be 
greater with close others (e.g., friends and romantic partners) and those perceived as similar to 
oneself (e.g., ingroup members) than with strangers (Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010; Savitsky, 
Keysar, Epley, Carter, & Swanson, 2011) or dissimilar others (Ames, 2004; Todd, Hanko, 
Galinsky, & Mussweiler, 2011). People also tend to be more egocentric when they are distracted 
by a concurrent task (Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010; Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012), under 
pressure to respond quickly (Epley et al., 2004), are members of individualistic cultures (Wu, 
Barr, Gann, & Keysar, 2013; Wu & Keysar, 2007), or occupy high-power roles (Galinsky, 
Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Overbeck & Droutman, 2013).  
INCIDENTAL ANXIETY AND EGOCENTRISM 
 
5 
In the current research, we explore a novel class of perceiver characteristicsÑspecific 
incidental emotional statesÑon egocentrism during mental-state reasoning. Although numerous 
studies have shown that incidental emotions (i.e., those triggered by unrelated prior experiences; 
Bodenhausen, 1993) can color judgment and behavior in a wide range of situations (e.g., 
Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Sheppard, 1994; DeSteno, Li, Dickens, & Lerner, 2014; Keltner, 
Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; see Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015, for a review), research 
has seldom examined the effects of incidental emotions on perspective taking. In one notable 
exception, Converse, Lin, Keysar, and Epley (2008) found that positive affect, which can 
undermine the effortful processing required for overcoming egocentrism (Bodenhausen, 1993; 
Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002), increased reliance on privileged knowledge when 
inferring a less-informed personÕs belief about an objectÕs location. Yet, because Converse and 
colleagues focused on global (positiveÐnegative) feeling states, the effects of specific incidental 
emotionsÑincluding emotions of the same valenceÑon perspective taking remain unknown.  
The current research examines the influence of incidental experiences of anxiety, one of 
the most pervasive emotional states that people experience (Brooks, 2014; Brooks & Schweitzer, 
2011), on perceptual and conceptual forms of perspective taking. We anticipate that incidental 
anxiety will increase reliance on oneÕs own egocentric perspective, undermining understanding 
of othersÕ mental states. Additionally, we explore a mechanismÑuncertainty appraisal 
tendenciesÑthrough which anxiety may exert these egocentric effects.  
Anxiety and Mental-State Reasoning 
Anxiety is a discrete emotional state triggered by situations that are novel, threatening, or 
otherwise have the potential for negative outcomes (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). Anxiety is 
characterized by unpleasantness (i.e., negative valence) and high activity (i.e., physiological 
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arousal) in RussellÕs (1980) circumplex model of affect, and by low certainty and low control in 
Smith and EllsworthÕs (1985) appraisal framework. Although some theorists treat anxiety and 
fear as distinct (albeit closely related) emotional phenomena (see hman, 2008), following 
others (e.g., Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Gray, 1991), we conceptualize anxiety as 
encompassing fear as well as the related states of apprehension, nervousness, tension, and worry. 
Historically, anxiety research has focused on trait anxiety, a personality characteristic similar to 
neuroticism that reflects a general disposition to experience anxious feelings (Barlow, 2002; 
Eysenck, 1997). We focus instead on state anxiety, a more transitory emotional state that anyone 
can experience in the presence of a potential threat.  
A sizable literature has shown how both trait and state anxiety shape intrapsychic aspects 
of cognition, such as attentional control, inferential reasoning, and risk preferences (e.g., Bishop, 
2009; Darke, 1988; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Fox, 1993; Raghunathan & 
Pham, 1999). Furthermore, although several studies have examined the effects of trait and state 
anxiety on social impression formation (e.g., Baron, Inman, Kao, & Logan, 1992; Curtis & 
Locke, 2007), little is known about whether and how anxiety affects social-cognitive processes 
involved in perspective taking.   
Some recent clinical work has tested the relationship between trait anxiety and mental-
state reasoning. For instance, some studies have found that adolescents high in attachment 
anxiety and adults meeting clinical criteria for social anxiety disorder (SAD) performed worse on 
a Òtheory of mindÓ task assessing the ability to discern othersÕ emotional states from their eyes 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) than did more securely attached 
adolescents (Hnefeldt, Laghi, Ortu, & Belardinelli, 2013) and non-SAD adults (Hezel & 
McNally, 2014), respectively. Because these studies used correlational and cross-sectional 
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designs, however, the causal effect of anxiety on mental-state reasoning, and the process(es) 
underlying this relationship, remain unexplored. Here, we examine whether and how incidental 
experiences of state anxiety triggered in one context affect reliance on egocentric information 
during perspective taking in an unrelated context.  
We propose that anxiety-related states may be particularly relevant for perspective taking 
for several reasons. First, anxiety leads to decrements in executive function (Eysenck et al., 
2007), a critical ingredient for resisting egocentric interference when reasoning about othersÕ 
differing perspectives (Fizke, Barthel, Peters, & Rakoczy, 2014; Lin et al., 2010). Second, 
anxiety heightens self-focused attention (Easterbrook, 1959; Sarason, 1975), which itself can 
increase reliance on self-knowledge during social prediction (Fenigstein & Abrams, 1993). 
Third, anxiety is typically accompanied by a sense of uncertainty (Lazarus, 1991; Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), which itself is associated with greater reliance on 
accessible knowledge during judgment (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Indeed, studies have found that enduring stressful, anxiety-inducing eventsÑand the 
subjective experience of uncertainty that accompanies such eventsÑcan increase reliance on 
self-generated numeric anchors (Inbar & Gilovich, 2011; see also Kassam, Kozlov, & Mendes, 
2009). Given the substantial overlap in processes underlying adjustment from self-generated 
numeric anchors when making numeric judgments (Epley & Gilovich, 2001) and processes 
underlying adjustment from accessible self-knowledge when reasoning about othersÕ mental 
states (Epley et al., 2004), it stands to reason that anxiety may operate similarly during mental-
state reasoning as when making numeric judgments. 
Together, this work led us to predict that anxiety would increase reliance on oneÕs own 
egocentric perspective during mental-state reasoning. Testing this general hypothesis was the 
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primary goal of the current research. A second goal of the current research was to examine a 
particular mechanism by which anxiety might increase egocentrism. We focused on the 
subjective feelings of uncertainty associated with anxiety. 
Uncertainty Appraisal Tendencies and Egocentric Mental-State Reasoning 
According to appraisal theories of emotion (see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003, for a review), 
emotions can be differentiated along several cognitive dimensions beyond valence and arousal 
(e.g., certainty, control). For instance, anxiety and anger are both negative, high-arousal 
emotions, but they differ on the appraisal dimension of certainty. Whereas anger is characterized 
by appraisals of high certainty, anxiety is associated with appraisals of uncertainty about what is 
currently happening in oneÕs environment and/or what will happen next (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985).  
Building on these classic appraisal theories, Lerner and Keltner (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 
2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) proposed that emotions and appraisals have a recursive 
relationship: Not only do particular cognitive appraisals (e.g., uncertainty) give rise to specific 
emotions (e.g., anxiety), but specific emotions activate specific cognitive and motivational 
processes, or appraisal tendencies, which, in turn, are responsible for the effects of specific 
emotions on judgment and behaviorÑeven in contexts that are completely removed from the 
emotion-eliciting source (see also Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). On this view, anxiety increases 
the motivation to reduce uncertainty, and people often do so by selecting more certain options. 
Supporting this idea, studies have found that, when faced with two options that differ in terms of 
their risk and reward (e.g., a job with high pay but low job security versus one with average pay 
but high job security), people experiencing anxiety tend to prefer the uncertainty-reducing, safer 
option (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Yip & Ct, 2013).  
INCIDENTAL ANXIETY AND EGOCENTRISM 
 
9 
Extending this logic to the domain of perspective taking, we suggest that people are 
usually more certain about their own cognitions than the cognitions of others. Consequently, the 
motivation to reduce uncertainty triggered by anxiety should make people especially likely to 
rely on self-knowledge when inferring othersÕ mental states, resulting in more egocentric 
inferences. In sum, we predicted that experiencing anxiety would increase egocentrism during 
mental-state reasoning, and that the uncertainty appraisal tendencies triggered by anxiety would 
help explain this increased egocentrism.  
Overview of Experiments 
We tested our key hypothesesÑthat anxiety would increase egocentrism and that 
uncertainty appraisal tendencies would drive this effectÑacross six experiments. In a first set of 
experiments, we induced incidental emotions and measured performance on perceptual 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and conceptual (Experiment 3) perspective-taking tasks. We predicted 
that people experiencing anxiety would display greater egocentrism than would those 
experiencing other negative, high-arousal emotions (i.e., anger or disgust) or neutral feelings. In 
a second set of experiments, we examined feelings of uncertainty as a potential mechanism 
underlying the effect of state anxiety on perspective taking. In Experiments 4A and 4B, we used 
an experimental-causal-chain design (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005) to test (a) whether anxiety 
increases uncertainty relative to anger, disgust, and neutral feelings, and (b) whether 
experiencing uncertainty (versus certainty) increases egocentrism. Following the logic of 
uncertainty as a mechanism, in Experiment 5, we explored whether positive emotions associated 
with uncertainty might produce increases in egocentrism that are comparable to anxiety. We 
focused on surprise as a positive, uncertainty-associated emotion. Although Smith and Ellsworth 
(1985) identified surprise as a positive emotion (it was second only to happiness in terms of 
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pleasantness in their analysis; see also Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Whitson, Galinsky, & Kay, 
2015), other work has found that surprise is not unequivocally positive (e.g., Noordewier & 
Breugelmans, 2013). For our purposes, the key point is that surprise is less negative than anxiety. 
In Experiment 5, we also used a measurement-of-mediation design (Baron & Kenny, 1986) to 
test whether feelings of uncertainty stemming from anxiety and surprise predict egocentrism.  
Across our experiments, we excluded data from non-native speakers, inattentive 
participants, and suspicious participants (i.e., those who articulated a causal relationship between 
the emotion induction and the primary dependent measure). These exclusions, which are 
discussed in greater detail in Appendix A, resulted in a reduction in sample size of no more than 
12% in any experiment. Although including these participantsÕ data reduced statistical 
significance in Experiment 3, in no experiment did these exclusions meaningfully alter the 
pattern of results (see the Table in Appendix A for complete analyses). We also report how we 
determined our sample sizes (see Appendix B), all manipulations, and all measures relevant for 
our hypotheses (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012).  
Experiment 1: Spontaneous Spatial Perspective Taking 
In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of incidental anxiety on the spontaneous 
tendency to adopt another personÕs spatial perspective. Participants underwent an incidental 
anxiety, anger, or neutral emotion induction, after which they identified the spatial location of an 
object that could be described from their own or from another personÕs perspective. We 
predicted that, relative to participants in the anger and neutral conditions, anxious participants 
would be more likely to describe the object from their own egocentric perspective. We also 
tested whether differences in generalized arousal could explain our results. 
Method 
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Participants and design. Native English-speaking American undergraduates (N=139) 
participated for course credit. We excluded data from four participants with unscorable location 
descriptions on the spatial perspective-taking task, leaving a final sample of 135 (89 women1; 
Mage=18.51, SD=0.71). Participants were randomly assigned to an incidental emotion condition: 
anxiety, anger, or neutral.  
Procedure and materials. On arrival at the lab, participants were greeted by an 
experimenter and led to an individual cubicle where they learned that they would be completing 
tasks for several unrelated experiments that had been combined into a single session for 
efficiency purposes. All experimental tasks were administered via computer.  
Incidental emotion manipulation. As part an Òautobiographical memoryÓ task, 
participants wrote about an emotionally evocative experience from their own lives (Strack, 
Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 1985); participants in the two emotion conditions received the 
following instructions (adapted from Gino, Brooks, & Schweitzer, 2012):  
Please describe, as best you can, a time in the past in which you felt very anxious [angry]. You 
might begin by describing the general feelings of anxiety [anger] you experienced in this 
situation. Then write about the details of the situation in which you felt very anxious [angry]. 
Please write in complete sentences and in as much detail as possible.  
Participants in the neutral condition wrote about how they typically spend their evenings (Gino et 
al., 2012). Prior research has shown that this type of autobiographical recall task is a valid means 
of inducing specific incidental emotions (e.g., Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Dunn & Schweitzer, 
2005; Tiedens & Linton, 2001), including anxiety-related states (e.g., Gino et al., 2012; 
Kuhbandner & Zehetleitner, 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Marzillier & Davey, 2005; Whitson 
et al., 2015; see Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011, for a meta-analysis), that have carry-over effects 
on subsequent judgments and behaviors.  
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Spatial perspective-taking task. Next, as part of a Òpilot test for future studies,Ó 
participants saw a photograph of a person sitting at a table, facing them, and looking at a book on 
the table (Tversky & Hard, 2009). Embedded among six filler questions about the photo (see 
Appendix C) was the critical question that served as our dependent measure: ÒOn which side of 
the table is the book?Ó The book sat on the right side of the table from participantsÕ own 
viewpoint; thus, we coded location descriptions mentioning Òthe right sideÓ as egocentric and 
descriptions mentioning Òthe left sideÓ as other-oriented. For descriptions mentioning both 
viewpoints, the first one mentioned determined the coding (see Tversky & Hard, 2009).   
Manipulation check. Finally, as a manipulation check, participants indicated the extent 
to which the experience they described during the writing task made them feel each of a series of 
specific emotions (1=not at all, 7=very much so). We averaged items assessing anxiety (anxious, 
nervous, tense, worried; α=.92), anger (angry, furious, irate, mad; α=.93), and neutral feelings 
(calm, indifferent, neutral, unemotional; α=.85). Participants also reported how much generalized 
arousal (alert, aroused, energetic, excited; α=.63) they experienced as they were writing.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. In this and all subsequent experiments, we examined the 
effectiveness of our emotion induction by conducting planned contrasts using two-group 
comparisons (e.g., anxiety versus anger). These contrast analyses revealed that anxious, angry, 
and neutral feelings were higher in the anxiety, anger, and neutral conditions, respectively, than 
in the other conditions (ts>6.93, ps<.001, ds>1.38). Generalized arousal was higher in the two 
emotion conditions than in the neutral condition (ts>2.38, ps<.019, ds>0.58). Unexpectedly, 
generalized arousal was also higher in the anxiety condition than in the anger condition, 
t(132)=1.99, p=.049, d=0.38 (see Table 1 for all Ms and SDs).  
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 Spatial perspective taking. To test our central prediction that incidental anxiety 
increases egocentrism, we conducted two planned contrasts (Rosenthal, Rubin, & Rosnow, 2000) 
using logistic regression analyses: One contrast compared the proportion of egocentric location 
descriptions in the anxiety condition versus the anger condition; the other compared the anxiety 
condition versus the neutral condition. As predicted, egocentrism was greater in the anxiety 
condition (34/47, 72.3%) than in both the anger condition (22/44, 50.0%; Contrast 1: b=.961, 
SE=.444, Wald=4.69, p=.030) and the neutral condition (20/44, 45.5%; Contrast 2: b=1.144, 
SE=.445, Wald=6.61, p=.010). An additional comparison revealed that the anger and neutral 
conditions did not differ from each other (b=.182, SE=.427, Wald<1, p=.67). Importantly, both 
the anxiety versus anger contrast (b=.916, SE=.450, Wald=4.15, p=.042) and the anxiety versus 
neutral contrast (b=1.037, SE=.472, Wald=4.82, p=.028) remained significant when controlling 
for differences in generalized arousal.  
Emotion intensity and egocentrism. As an additional examination of the proposed 
relationship between anxiety and egocentrism, we regressed the proportion of egocentric location 
descriptions on anxiety intensity (from the manipulation check) across all participants (see 
DeSteno et al., 2014, for a similar approach). As expected, reported feelings of anxiety positively 
predicted egocentrism (b=.205, SE=.088, Wald=5.47, p=.019). When regressing egocentrism on 
feelings of anxiety, anger, and generalized arousal simultaneously, only anxiety emerged as a 
marginally significant predictor (b=.194, SE=.104, Wald=3.51, p=.061). Neither anger intensity 
(b=-.029, SE=.096, Wald<1, p=.76) nor generalized arousal (b=.061, SE=.162, Wald<1, p=.71) 
were reliable predictors.  
These results provide initial support for the hypothesis that incidental experiences of 
anxiety increase egocentrism during perspective taking. Compared with angry and neutral 
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participants, anxious participants were more likely to spontaneously describe an object using 
their own rather than another personÕs spatial perspective. Although anxious participants 
reported higher levels of generalized arousal than did angry participants, the egocentrism-
enhancing effect of anxiety was not explained by differences in generalized arousal.  
Experiment 2: Speeded Spatial Perspective Taking 
In Experiment 2, we aimed to extend these findings in several ways. First, we included 
another negative, high-arousal emotion (i.e., disgust) for comparison against anxiety. Second, we 
used a different neutral condition. Third, we used a novel, speeded spatial perspective-taking task 
inspired by the classic Ôthree mountains taskÕ (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956) as our focal dependent 
measure. Across multiple trials, participants had to quickly and accurately identify the spatial 
location of an object, either from their own perspective (ÔselfÕ trials) or from other individualsÕ 
perspectives (ÔotherÕ trials). Because responding from othersÕ perspectives requires resisting 
egocentric interference from oneÕs own spatial perspective, we anticipated that participants 
would experience greater difficulty on ÔotherÕ trials than on ÔselfÕ trials and that anxiety would 
increase this egocentric bias. Moreover, because this task includes a mental-rotation component, 
we also tested whether differences in mental-rotation ability could explain our results.  
Method 
Participants and design. Native German-speaking university students (N=246) 
participated for a chocolate bar or coffee voucher. We excluded data from one participant 
because of a computer malfunction, eight participants who had a high number of invalid 
responses on the spatial perspective-taking task (>30% of trials), and eight participants for 
suspicion, leaving a final sample of 229 (175 women; Mage=22.33, SD=3.52). Participants were 
randomly assigned to an incidental emotion condition: anxiety, anger, disgust, or neutral. 
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Procedure and materials. On arrival at the lab, participants were greeted by an 
experimenter and led to an individual cubicle where they learned that they would be completing 
tasks for several unrelated experiments that had been combined into a single session for 
efficiency purposes. All experimental tasks were administered via computer.  
Incidental emotion manipulation. As in Experiment 1, under the guise of an 
Òautobiographical memoryÓ task, participants in the emotion conditions wrote about an 
emotionally evocative experienceÑspecifically, a time when they felt very anxious, very angry, 
or very disgusted. Participants in the neutral condition did not complete the writing task.  
Spatial perspective-taking task. Next, as part of a Òperceptual judgmentÓ task, 
participants completed a series of trials in which they identified the spatial location of a green 
light, either from their own perspective or from the perspective of one of two agents who 
appeared on the screen. Participants pressed one of three response keys to indicate the green 
lightÕs location: left (W key), right (P key), or middle (spacebar). A blue bar signaled whose 
perspective should be taken. On ÔselfÕ trials, the blue bar appeared at the bottom of the screen, 
indicating that participants should use their own perspective; on ÔotherÕ trials, the blue bar 
appeared under one of the two other agents (see Figure 1 for stimulus examples). There were 30 
self trials and 30 other trials (15 for each agent), for a total of 60 trials that appeared in 
randomized order. Ten practice trials preceded the experimental trials. We asked participants to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Incorrect responses were followed by a red X, 
which remained on screen for 1500 ms.  
Mental-rotation task. Participants also completed three mental-rotation items. They 
indicated which of three rotated geometric shapes matched a target shape.  
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Manipulation check. As before, participants reported the emotions they experienced 
during the writing task. We averaged the anxiety (α=.89), anger (α=.94), disgust (disgusted, 
nauseated, repulsed, sick; α=.91), and neutral (α=.78) items.  
Results and Discussion 
 Manipulation check. Planned contrasts revealed that anxious, angry, disgusted, and 
neutral feelings were higher in the anxiety, anger, disgust, and neutral conditions, respectively, 
than in the other conditions (ts>5.38, ps<.001, ds>1.01; see Table 1 for Ms and SDs).  
Spatial perspective taking.  
Analytic strategy. Our central hypothesis concerned the effect of anxiety on overall 
difficulty when responding from othersÕ spatial perspectives, relative to oneÕs own, rather than on 
speed or accuracy per se. Thus, following prior perspective-taking research (Apperly, Back, 
Samson, & France, 2008; Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010), we integrated speed and accuracy 
into a single metric of processing cost, or inverse efficiency score, that appropriately weighs the 
impact of each (Townsend & Ashby, 1983). This entails dividing the mean correct response time 
(RT) by the proportion of correct responses. It should be noted that interpretation of this 
processing cost metric can be problematic when error rates are high (>15%) or when error rates 
and RTs are not in unison; consequently, its use is recommended only when error rates are low 
and error rates and RTs are positively correlated (Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011; Townsend & 
Ashby, 1983). Because both of these prerequisites were met in our dataÑthe overall error rate 
was under 10% and error rates and RTs were significantly positively correlated (r=.31, 
p<.001)Ñwe used processing cost as our unit of analysis.  
Prior to analyses, we discarded response times (RTs) >2000 ms2 (Samson, Apperly, 
Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010) as outliers (4.8% of responses) and log-
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transformed3 the remaining RTs to reduce positive skew (Fazio, 1990). We then calculated 
processing cost by dividing the mean correct log-transformed RTs by the proportion of correct 
responses (Townsend & Ashby, 1983). We also report separate error and RT analyses in the 
Supplemental Materials. These analyses indicate that our results appear to be driven more by 
error rates than by RTs, though, importantly, the pattern of results is consistent across metrics.  
Egocentric processing cost. To allow for direct comparison with Experiment 1, we 
computed egocentric processing cost as our main dependent measure by subtracting processing 
cost on the ÔselfÕ trials from processing cost on the ÔotherÕ trials; higher scores reflect greater 
difficulty identifying othersÕ perspectives relative to oneÕs own. We also report processing cost 
separately for the ÔotherÕ trials and the ÔselfÕ trials.  
We tested our central prediction that anxiety increases egocentrism by conducting three 
planned contrasts on the egocentric processing cost index: anxiety versus anger, anxiety versus 
disgust, and anxiety versus neutral. As predicted, egocentric processing cost was greater in the 
anxiety condition (M=255 ms, SD=210) than in the anger (M=167 ms, SD=171; Contrast 1: 
t[225]=2.51, p=.013, d=0.39), disgust (M=171 ms, SD=146; Contrast 2: t[225]=2.53, p=.012, 
d=0.40), and neutral conditions (M=191 ms, SD=152; Contrast 3: t[225]=2.14, p=.033, d=0.34). 
Additional comparisons revealed that the latter three conditions did not differ from one another 
(|t|s<1, ps>.67, |d|s<0.10).  
 Processing cost on the ÔotherÕ trials. Using these same three contrasts, we examined 
processing cost on the ÔotherÕ trials. As predicted and displayed in Figure 2, anxious participants 
displayed greater processing cost than did angry (Contrast 1: t[225]=2.63, p=.009, d=0.38), 
disgusted (Contrast 2: t[225]=3.29, p=.001, d=0.47), and neutral participants (Contrast 3: 
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t[225]=2.74, p=.007, d=0.39). Additional comparisons revealed that the latter three conditions 
did not differ from one another (|t|s<1, ps>.57, |d|s<0.20; see Table 2 for Ms and SDs). 
 Processing cost on the ÔselfÕ trials. None of the three anxiety-related contrasts on 
processing cost on the ÔselfÕ trials was significant (|t|s<1, ps>.63, |d|s<0.07). Additional 
comparisons revealed no significant differences among the anger, disgust, and neutral conditions 
(|t|s<1, ps>.38, |d|s<0.12; see Table 2 for Ms and SDs). 
 Mental rotation. Mental-rotation performance (Mcorrect=2.37, SD=0.75) did not differ by 
emotion condition (F<1, p>.80). Additionally, when controlling for mental-rotation performance, 
each of the previously reported contrasts involving anxiety on egocentric processing cost 
(ps<.045) and on processing cost on the ÔotherÕ trials (ps<.009) remained significant.  
Emotion intensity and egocentrism. To further examine the proposed relationship 
between anxiety and egocentrism, we regressed egocentric processing cost on reported feelings 
of anxiety across all participants. As expected, anxiety intensity positively predicted egocentrism 
(b=.057, SE=.026, β=.15, t=2.24, p=.026). When regressing egocentrism on feelings of anxiety, 
anger, and disgust simultaneously, anxiety marginally positively predicted egocentric processing 
cost (b=.054, SE=.029, β=.14, t=1.88, p=.062), whereas anger did not (b=.038, SE=.026, β=.11, 
t=1.46, p=.15). Feelings of disgust negatively predicted egocentrism (b=-.050, SE=.025, β=-.14, 
t=2.00, p=.047).  
We also examined the relationship between emotion intensity and processing cost 
separately for the ÔotherÕ trials and the ÔselfÕ trials. In a first simultaneous regression analysis, 
anxiety intensity predicted greater processing cost on the ÔotherÕ trials (b=.072, SE=.025, β=.21, 
t=2.93, p=.004), whereas anger intensity did not (b=.023, SE=.022, β=.08, t=1.02, p=.31). 
Disgust intensity predicted lower processing cost on the ÔotherÕ trials (b=-.045, SE=.022, β=-.15, 
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t=2.07, p=.040). A second simultaneous regression analysis revealed that neither anxiety 
intensity (b=.019, SE=.019, β=.08, t<1, p=.32), anger intensity (b=-.015, SE=.017, β=-.07, t<1, 
p=.37), nor disgust intensity (b=.005, SE=.016, β=.02, t<1, p=.75) significantly predicted 
processing cost on the ÔselfÕ trials.  
These results replicate those from Experiment 1 with a different spatial perspective-
taking task. Anxious participants had greater difficulty looking beyond their own perceptual 
vantage points than did angry, disgusted, and neutral participants. These findings were not 
explained by differences in mental-rotation performance.  
Experiment 3: Conceptual Perspective Taking 
Our first two experiments found that anxiety increased egocentrism in perceptual forms 
of perspective taking. In Experiment 3, we examined a different type of perspective taking. After 
undergoing an anxiety or anger induction, participants predicted how a nave recipient would 
interpret a set of ambiguous e-mail messages. Prior research has demonstrated that people are 
often ÒcursedÓ by their own knowledge of the message senderÕs true intentions when predicting 
the recipientÕs likely reaction (Epley et al., 2004; Keysar, 1994). We anticipated that anxiety 
would increase this egocentric tendency. 
Method 
Participants and design. Native English-speaking American users of AmazonÕs 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk; N=164) participated for modest monetary compensation ($0.40). We 
excluded data from 11 participants for suspicion and six participants for inattention, leaving a 
final sample of 147 (84 women; Mage=37.80, SD=12.87). Participants were randomly assigned to 
an incidental emotion condition: anxiety or anger.  
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Procedure and materials. Participants learned that they would be completing tasks for 
several unrelated experiments that had been combined into a single session for efficiency 
purposes. All experimental tasks were administered online.  
Incidental emotion manipulation. As in Experiments 1 and 2, under the guise of an 
Òautobiographical memoryÓ task, participants wrote about an emotionally evocative 
experienceÑspecifically, a time when they felt very anxious or very angry.  
Conceptual perspective-taking task. Next, as part of a Òtext comprehensionÓ task, 
participants read two different scenarios (order counterbalanced) involving ambiguous e-mail 
messages (Keysar, 1994; see Appendix D). In the privileged-knowledge scenario, participants 
had privileged information about the senderÕs intentions (i.e., the sender intended the message to 
be sarcastic) that was unavailable to the recipient. In the shared-knowledge scenario, participants 
and the recipient had identical information (i.e., the sender intended it to be sincere). Participants 
predicted how the recipient would interpret the message (1=very sarcastic, 7=very sincere).  
Manipulation check. Finally, participants reported the emotions they experienced during 
the writing task. We averaged the anxiety (α=.88) and anger (α=.97) items. 
Results and Discussion 
 Manipulation check. Feelings of anxiety were higher in the anxiety condition than in the 
anger condition, t(145)=3.20, p=.002, d=0.53. Angry feelings were higher in the anger condition 
than in the anxiety condition, t(145)=10.65, p<.001, d=1.76 (see Table 1 for Ms and SDs). 
Conceptual perspective taking. A 2 (Emotion) × 2 (Scenario) mixed ANOVA on the 
sincerity ratings revealed a main effect of Scenario, F(1, 145)=57.07, p<.001, ηp
2=.282. Overall, 
participants displayed a robust Òcurse of knowledgeÓ bias. More importantly, the two-way 
interaction was significant, F(1, 145)=4.48, p=.036, ηp
2=.030. As anticipated and displayed in 
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Figure 3, when the message implied sarcasm (privileged-knowledge scenario), anxious 
participants (M=4.44, SD=1.78) predicted that the recipient would infer less sincerity than did 
angry participants (M=5.11, SD=1.76), t(145)=2.30, p=.023, d=0.39. When the message implied 
sincerity (shared-knowledge scenario), however, sincerity ratings in the anxiety (M=6.00, 
SD=1.13) and anger conditions (M=5.98, SD=1.20) did not differ (|t|<1, p>.94, |d|<.05).  
Emotion intensity and egocentrism. To further examine the proposed relationship 
between anxiety and egocentrism, we created an egocentrism index by subtracting sincerity 
ratings on the privileged-knowledge scenario from those on the shared-knowledge scenario and 
regressed this index on anxiety intensity across all participants. Note that this index parallels the 
two-way interaction reported above. As expected, feelings of anxiety positively predicted 
egocentrism (b=.208, SE=.093, β=.18, t=2.23, p=.027). When regressing egocentrism on feelings 
of anxiety and anger simultaneously, only anxiety emerged as a significant predictor (b=.228, 
SE=.094, β=.20, t=2.43, p=.016); anger was a non-significant negative predictor (b=-.116, 
SE=.071, β=-.13, t=1.63, p=.105).  
We also examined the relationship between emotion intensity and sincerity ratings 
separately for the privileged-knowledge and shared-knowledge scenarios. In a first simultaneous 
regression analysis, anxiety intensity predicted marginally lower sincerity (higher sarcasm) 
ratings on the privileged-knowledge scenarios (b=-.164, SE=.085, β=-.16, t=1.93, p=.055), 
whereas anger intensity predicted higher sincerity (lower sarcasm) ratings (b=.127, SE=.065, 
β=.16, t=1.97, p=.050). A second simultaneous regression analysis revealed that neither anxiety 
(b=.064, SE=.056, β=.10, t=1.13, p=.26) nor anger intensity (b=.012, SE=.043, β=.02, t<1, 
p=.79) significantly predicted sincerity ratings on the shared-knowledge scenarios. Note that 
these analyses parallel the simple effects reported above. 




These results indicate that incidental anxiety can magnify the Òcurse of knowledgeÓ when 
reasoning about othersÕ beliefs, thereby extending findings from the first two experiments to 
conceptual forms of perspective taking. Feeling anxious impaired peopleÕs ability to set aside 
their own privileged knowledge when predicting a nave message recipientÕs interpretation of an 
ambiguous message. Taken together, the results of Experiments 1Ð3 suggest that incidental 
anxiety can increase egocentrism in both perceptual and conceptual forms of perspective taking. 
In our final three experiments, we explore a mechanism that may underlie these findings.  
Experiments 4A and 4B: The Role of Uncertainty  
 Anxiety differs from anger and disgust along several appraisal dimensions, including the 
degree of uncertainty that accompanies each emotion (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985). Whereas anger and disgust are associated with appraisals of high certainty, 
anxiety is associated with low certainty (i.e., uncertainty). In Experiments 4A and 4B, we used 
an experimental-causal-chain approach (Spencer et al., 2005) to examine the activation of 
uncertainty appraisal tendencies (Lerner & Keltner, 2000) as a potential mechanism underlying 
the egocentrism-enhancing effects of anxiety. In Experiment 4A, we test whether anxiety 
increases uncertainty. In Experiment 4B, we test whether feelings of uncertainty increase 
egocentrism when reasoning about another personÕs differing conceptual perspective.  
Experiment 4A: Anxiety à  Uncertainty 
 Method. Native English-speaking American MTurk users (N=284) participated for 
modest monetary compensation ($0.40). We excluded data from four participants for inattention, 
leaving a final sample of 280 (175 women; Mage=31.05, SD=10.40). Participants learned that 
they would be completing several unrelated experimental tasks that had been combined into a 
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single online session for efficiency purposes. As in Experiments 1Ð3, participants were randomly 
assigned to write about an emotionally evocative experienceÑspecifically, a time in the past 
when they felt very anxious, angry, or disgusted. In the neutral condition, participants wrote 
about how they typically spend their evenings. Next, participants indicated how uncertain they 
were about what was happening around them in the situation they described (1=not at all, 7=very 
much so; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
 Results. To test our central prediction that anxiety increases uncertainty appraisal 
tendencies, we conducted three planned contrasts: anxiety versus anger, anxiety versus disgust, 
and anxiety versus neutral. As predicted, anxious participants (M=4.79, SD=1.92) reported 
greater uncertainty than did angry (M=3.94, SD=2.05; Contrast 1: t[275]=2.45, p=.015, d=0.30), 
disgusted (M=3.29, SD=2.10; Contrast 2: t[275]=4.36, p<.001, d=0.53), or neutral participants 
(M=2.75, SD=2.05; Contrast 3: t[275]=6.10, p<.001, d=0.74). Unexpectedly, angry participants 
reported more uncertainty than did neutral participants (t[275]=3.44, p=.001, d=0.41) and 
marginally more than did disgusted participants (t[275]=1.82, p=.070, d=0.22).  
Experiment 4B: Uncertainty à  Egocentrism 
 Method. Native English-speaking American MTurk users (N=178) participated for 
modest monetary compensation ($0.40). We excluded data from eight participants for suspicion 
and 12 participants for inattention, leaving a final sample of 158 (89 women; Mage=37.23, 
SD=13.97). Participants learned that they would be completing several unrelated experimental 
tasks that had been combined into a single online session for efficiency purposes. Under the 
guise of an Òautobiographical memoryÓ task, participants were randomly assigned to describe 
three experiences that made them feel either very certain or very uncertain. They received these 
instructions (adapted from Clarkson, Tormala, & Rucker, 2008): 
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WeÕd like you to list three experiences youÕve had in which you felt a great deal of [un]certainty. 
WeÕre specifically interested in times in your life in which you felt [un]certain about what was 
happening around you and/or [un]certain about what would happen next. In each of the three 
boxes that appear on the next several screens, please describe a different experience in which you 
felt highly [un]certain. 
Next, as part of a Òtext comprehensionÓ task, participants completed the same conceptual 
perspective-taking task involving ambiguous e-mail messages that we used in Experiment 3 
(Keysar, 1994).  
Results. A 2 (Certainty) × 2 (Scenario) mixed ANOVA on the sincerity ratings revealed 
a main effect of Scenario, F(1, 156)=43.29, p<.001, ηp
2=.217. As in Experiment 3, overall, 
participants displayed a robust Òcurse of knowledgeÓ bias. There was also a main effect of 
Certainty, F(1, 156)=4.21, p=.049, ηp
2=.025. Participants in the uncertainty condition provided 
lower sincerity ratings than did participants in the certainty condition. More importantly, the 
two-way interaction was significant, F(1, 156)=8.47, p=.004, ηp
2=.051. As displayed in Figure 4, 
when the message implied sarcasm (privileged-knowledge scenario), uncertain participants 
(M=4.40, SD=2.02) predicted that the recipient would infer less sincerity than did certain 
participants (M=5.29, SD=1.88), t(156)=2.86, p=.005, d=0.45. When the message implied 
sincerity (shared-knowledge scenario), however, sincerity ratings for uncertain (M=6.07, 
SD=1.12) and certain participants (M=5.94, SD=1.32) did not differ (|t|<1, p>.47, |d|<.11).  
Discussion 
Together, the results from Experiments 4A and 4B suggest that the uncertainty associated 
with anxiety can help explain the egocentrism-enhancing effects of anxiety. Feelings of anxiety 
were accompanied by greater feelings of uncertainty (Experiment 4A), and heightened 
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uncertainty increased reliance on accessible, yet privileged, knowledge when predicting another 
personÕs interpretation of an ambiguous message (Experiment 4B). 
Experiment 5: Positive and Negative Emotions Differing in Subjective Uncertainty 
 If subjective feelings of uncertainty increase reliance on self-knowledge during 
perspective taking, then positive emotions associated with uncertainty should produce 
comparable effects. To test this hypothesis, in Experiment 5, we independently manipulated 
emotion certainty and emotion valence, and we assessed conceptual perspective taking with a set 
of scenarios in which participants must set aside their own privileged knowledge to infer othersÕ 
beliefs (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). We predicted that emotions characterized by uncertainty 
(anxiety and surprise), independent of emotion valence (negative and positive, respectively; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; cf. Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013), would lead to more egocentric 
errors when inferring othersÕ false beliefs than would emotions associated with certainty (anger 
and pride). To further explore the role of uncertainty in explaining these effects, we used a 
measurement-of-mediation design (Baron & Kenny, 1986) to test a model wherein uncertainty 
underlies the effect on uncertainty-associated emotion egocentrism (see Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  
Method 
 Participants and design. Native English-speaking American MTurk users (N=292) 
participated for modest monetary compensation ($0.50). We excluded data from five participants 
for inattention, leaving a final sample of 287 (184 women; Mage=35.79, SD=12.32). Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the conditions in a 2 (Emotion Valence: positive, negative) × 2 
(Emotion Certainty: certainty-associated, uncertainty-associated) design. 
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 Procedure and materials. Participants learned that they would be completing tasks for 
several unrelated experiments that had been combined into a single session for efficiency 
purposes. All experimental tasks were administered online.  
Incidental emotion manipulation. As in Experiments 1Ð3 and 4A, under the guise of an 
Òautobiographical memoryÓ task, participants wrote about an emotionally evocative 
experienceÑspecifically, a time when they felt very anxious (uncertain, negative), angry 
(certain, negative), surprised (uncertain, positive), or proud (certain, positive).  
 Conceptual perspective-taking task. Next, as part of a Òtext comprehensionÓ task, 
participants read (in randomized order) a series of 12 scenarios involving one or more characters 
(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; see Appendix E). In the 6 false-belief scenarios, participants read 
about an exchange between two characters, and they received privileged information that was 
unavailable to one of the characters. In the control scenarios, participants read about a physical 
characteristic of a single character. Following each scenario, participants completed a forced-
choice, fill-in-the-blank item consisting of a single sentence with one word missing. They 
selected one of two response options to complete the sentence. The key difference between the 
false-belief and control scenarios was that the former required mental-state reasoning (i.e., 
participants had to set aside their own privileged knowledge to infer the less-informed 
characterÕs false belief), whereas the latter did not. To increase the difficulty of the task and 
thereby increase variability in error rates, we instructed participants to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible (see Epley et al., 2004). 
Manipulation checks. Finally, participants completed three sets of manipulation checks, 
all on seven-point scales (1=not at all, 7=very much so). The first set of items assessed the 
effectiveness of the emotion certainty manipulation. Participants answered the same question 
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from Experiment 4A regarding the degree of uncertainty they experienced when recalling the 
emotionally-evocative event. They also indicated how well they could predict what would 
happen next in the situation they described (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Because these two items 
were only modestly correlated (α=.40), we analyzed them separately. The second set of items 
assessed the effectiveness of the emotion valence manipulation. Participants indicated the extent 
to which the event they described was unpleasant and enjoyable (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). We 
averaged these items (after reverse-scoring) to form a measure of emotion valence (α=.88). The 
third set of items mirrored those from Experiments 1Ð3. Participants indicated the extent to 
which the recalled experience made them feel each of a series of specific emotions. We averaged 
the anxiety (anxious, worried; α=.85), anger (angry, mad; α=.96), surprise (surprised, shocked; 
α=.81), and pride (proud, successful; α=.94) items.  
Results and Discussion 
 Manipulation checks. Reported levels of uncertainty experienced during the recalled 
event was greater in the uncertain emotion conditions (anxiety and surprise combined; M=4.28, 
SD=2.13) than in the certain emotion conditions (anger and pride combined; M=3.34, SD=2.25), 
t(285)=3.65, p<.001, d=0.43. Conversely, ability to predict what would happen next during the 
recalled event was lower in the uncertain emotion conditions (M=3.40, SD=1.92) than in the 
certain emotion conditions (M=4.60, SD=2.07), t(285)=5.06, p<.001, d=0.60. Additionally, 
positivity was greater in the positive emotion conditions (pride and surprise combined; M=5.79, 
SD=1.66) than the negative emotion conditions (anger and anxiety combined; M=2.09, 
SD=1.40), t(284)=20.40, p<.001, d=2.41. Finally, planned contrasts revealed that anxious, angry, 
surprised, and proud feelings were greater in the anxiety, anger, surprise, and pride conditions, 
respectively, than the other conditions (ts>3.59, ps<.001, ds>0.59; see Table 1 for Ms and SDs). 
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 Conceptual perspective taking. A 2 (Valence) × 2 (Certainty) × 2 (Scenario) mixed 
ANOVA on error rates revealed a main effect of Scenario, F(1, 283)=42.03, p<.001, ηp
2=.129. 
Overall, errors were higher on the false-belief scenarios than on the control scenarios. As 
predicted and displayed in Figure 5, the only significant two-way interaction was between 
Certainty and Scenario, F(1, 283)=8.50, p=.004, ηp
2=.029. Participants induced to experience 
uncertainty-associated emotions (M=13.87%, SD=20.08) made more errors on the false-belief 
scenarios than did those experiencing certainty-associated emotions (M=9.42%, SD=15.59), 
t(285)=2.33, p=.038, d=0.25, whereas errors on the control scenarios were comparable for those 
experiencing uncertainty-associated (M=4.59%, SD=11.11) and certainty-associated emotions 
(M=6.04%, SD=14.09; |t|<1, p>.33, |d|<0.12). Importantly, the pattern of findings captured by 
this two-way interaction was equally strong for positive and negative emotions, as indicated by a 
non-significant Valence × Certainty × Scenario interaction (F<1, p>.62). 
Emotion intensity, feelings of uncertainty, and egocentrism. To further examine the 
proposed relationship between uncertainty-associated emotions and egocentrism, we conducted a 
series of regression analyses using the proportion of errors on the false-belief scenarios as the 
criterion. We also report the results of these same analyses using the proportion of errors on the 
control scenarios as the criterion.  
In a first set of analyses, we used reported intensity on each of the different emotions 
across participants as separate predictors. Neither of the uncertainty-associated emotions 
(anxiety: β=.04, p=.53; surprise: β=-.04, p=.54) nor either of the certainty-associated emotions 
(anger: β=-.02, p=.86; pride: β=.08, p=.93) significantly predicted the proportion of errors on the 
false-belief scenarios or the proportion of errors on the control scenarios (anxiety: β=.01, p=.94; 
surprise: β=-.08, p=.21; anger: β=.14, p=.10; pride: β=.17, p=.06).  
INCIDENTAL ANXIETY AND EGOCENTRISM 
 
29 
In a second set of analyses, we used reported feelings of uncertainty about what was 
happening in the recalled event across participants as the predictor. Feelings of uncertainty 
predicted a greater proportion of errors on the false-belief scenarios (b=.011, SE=.005, β=.14, 
t=2.39, p=.018), but not on the control scenarios (b=.004, SE=.003, β=.07, t=1.10, p=.27).4 
The mediating role of uncertainty. We next conducted a mediation analysis testing a 
model in which feelings of uncertainty underlie the effects of uncertainty-associated emotions on 
egocentric false-belief reasoning (see Figure 6). Because our interest was in explaining the link 
between uncertainty-associated emotions (regardless of valence) and egocentrism, we collapsed 
across valence in this analysis. A simultaneous regression analysis revealed that controlling for 
subjective uncertainty reduced the effect of Emotion Certainty condition (0=certainty-associated 
emotions [anger and pride combined], 1=uncertainty-associated emotions [anxiety and surprise 
combined]) on the proportion of errors on the false-belief scenarios (b=.035, SE=.022, β=.097, 
t=1.63, p=.10). A bias-corrected bootstrapping analysis (Hayes, 2013) revealed that the indirect 
path through subjective uncertainty was significant (b=.009, SE=.005; 95% CI [.002, .023]).5 
These results provide additional support for the hypothesis that uncertainty appraisal 
tendencies underlie egocentrism during mental-state reasoning. Experiencing uncertainty-
associated emotions (i.e., anxiety and surprise), regardless of valence, increased reliance on 
privileged knowledge when inferring othersÕ beliefs. Pride, a self-focused emotion (Tracy & 
Robins, 2004), did not increase egocentrism, which suggests that differences in self-focused 
attention are unlikely to explain our findings. We return to the potential mediating role of self-
focused attention in the General Discussion.  
Meta-Analytic Summary of Emotion Intensity and Egocentrism 
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 In Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5, we reported the relationship between experienced emotions 
across participants and our primary outcome variables. Because the magnitude of the relationship 
between emotion intensity and egocentric mental-state reasoning varied across experiments (e.g., 
anxiety intensity did not significantly predict egocentrism in Experiment 5), we conducted two 
sets of meta-analyses to determine the overall reliability and magnitude of this relationship: one 
anxiety intensity as the predictor, the other using anger intensity as the predictor. The specific 
criterion variables for both meta-analyses were as follows: egocentric location descriptions in 
Experiment 1, processing cost on the ÔotherÕ trials in Experiment 2, sincerity judgments on the 
privileged-knowledge scenarios in Experiment 3 (reverse-scored so higher values reflect more 
egocentrism), and errors on the false-belief scenarios in Experiment 5.  
To conduct these analyses, we used the relevant βs and SEs from the simultaneous 
regression analyses in each experiment. We calculated each meta-analytic β by weighing the β 
for each effect from each experiment by the inverse of its variance, and we calculated each meta-
analytic SE by taking the square root of the reciprocal of the sum of the weights. We then 
conducted hypothesis tests on these meta-analytic effects by dividing the meta-analytic β by the 
meta-analytic SE, yielding a Z statistic (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Consistent with the 
experimental results reported above, these analyses revealed that anxiety intensity positively 
predicted egocentrism (β=.14, Z=3.39, p<.001), whereas anger intensity was a non-significant 
negative predictor of egocentrism (β=-.03, Z<1, p=.51).  
General Discussion 
Across six experiments, we found converging evidence that incidental anxiety can 
increase egocentrism when intuiting what other people see and know. Compared with individuals 
experiencing anger, disgust, and neutral feelings, those experiencing anxiety were more likely to 
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describe an object using their own spatial perspective (Experiment 1), to have difficulty resisting 
egocentric interference when identifying an object from othersÕ spatial perspectives (Experiment 
2), and to mistakenly assume that an uninformed person would interpret an ambiguous message, 
or otherwise behave, in line with their own privileged knowledge (Experiments 3 and 5). These 
findings extend earlier correlational and cross-sectional research (Hezel & McNally, 2014; 
Hnefeldt et al., 2013) by causally linking anxiety to impaired mental-state reasoning.  
Our use of multiple comparison emotions across experiments allowed us to isolate the 
effects of anxiety and provided valuable clues for a potential mechanism underlying our findings. 
Comparing anxiety with anger (Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 5) and disgust (Experiment 2) suggests 
that the egocentric effect of anxiety cannot be explained by the combination of negative valence 
and high arousal alone; rather, it seems that feeling anxious uniquely led to an increased reliance 
on oneÕs own egocentric perspective, to the detriment of understanding othersÕ viewpoints. 
Additionally, our inclusion of a neutral condition (Experiments 1 and 2) suggests that anxiety 
increases egocentrism, rather than other negative, high-arousal emotions decreasing it. This latter 
finding may shed new light on prior work showing that people experiencing certainty-associated 
emotions were less susceptible to anchoring effects than were those experiencing uncertainty-
associated emotions (Inbar & Gilovich, 2011). Although Inbar and Gilovich interpret their 
findings as certainty-associated emotions increasing adjustment away from self-generated 
numeric anchors, our findings suggest that their results might actually reflect decreased 
adjustment from self-generated knowledge when experiencing uncertainty-associated emotions.  
Importantly, our final three experiments provided direct process evidence by showing 
that the uncertainty appraisal tendencies triggered by anxiety may underlie its egocentrism-
enhancing effects. Specifically, we found that anxiety increased feelings of uncertainty 
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tendencies (Experiments 4A and 5), and that this heightened sense of uncertainty, in turn, led to 
greater reliance on privileged knowledge when intuiting othersÕ beliefs (Experiments 4B and 5). 
Furthermore, showing that surprise increased egocentrism in Experiment 5, but that the self-
focused emotion of pride (Tracy & Robins, 2004) did not, suggests that differences in self-
focused attention are unlikely to account for our findings.  
To further examine the role of self-focused attention in explaining the egocentric effects 
of anxiety in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5, we computed an index of first-person singular pronoun 
usage (Pennebaker, 2011; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980) in the autobiographical recall essays our 
participants wrote by counting the number of first-person singular pronouns (e.g., I, me, my) 
they used and dividing by the total number of words they wrote. We then conducted two sets of 
meta-analyses using this index of self-focused attention. One examined the effect of anxiety on 
self-focused attention; the other examined the relationship between self-focus across participants 
and egocentric mental-state reasoning (for more details, see the Supplemental Materials). These 
analyses revealed that, across experiments, anxious participants used a greater proportion of first-
person singular pronouns than did participants in the other emotion conditions (d=0.35, Z=4.04, 
p<.001); however, first-person singular pronoun usage did not significantly predict egocentric 
mental-state reasoning (β=.05, Z=1.22, p=.22), suggesting that increases in self-focus are 
unlikely to explain the egocentric effects of anxiety in the current research. It is worth noting, 
however, that our experiments were not specifically designed to test a differential self-focus 
account. Future research will be needed to determine the role (if any) of self-focused attention in 
accounting for the egocentric effects of anxiety on mental-state reasoning.  
Strengths and Limitations 
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We highlight several strengths of the current research. First, the effects of incidental 
anxiety were consistent across four different perspective-taking tasks (two perceptual, two 
conceptual), multiple comparison emotions (anger, disgust, and neutral feelings), and participant 
samples from two different countries (United States and Germany). Second, recognizing the 
limitations of any single approach for testing for mediation, we used both experimental-causal-
chain (Spencer et al., 2005) and measurement-of-mediation designs (Baron & Kenny, 1986) and 
found support for a model in which uncertainty appraisal tendencies underlie the egocentric 
effects of anxiety (and surprise) on mental-state reasoning. Together, this methodological 
diversity attests to the robustness of our findings. Nevertheless, we concur with others (e.g., 
Bullock, Green & Ha, 2010) that process evidence is best established through programs of 
research that systematically test among multiple, theoretically plausible mediators.  
We also acknowledge several limitations of the current research, each of which suggests 
potential directions for future research. First, our experiments relied exclusively on an 
autobiographical recall task to induce incidental emotions. Although such tasks are among the 
most frequently used and valid methods for inducing specific emotions, including anxiety-related 
states (Lench et al., 2011), future research using different emotion inductions, such as watching 
an anxiety-eliciting video clip (Gino et al., 2012) or anticipating a stressful experience (e.g., an 
impromptu public performance; Brooks, 2014), will be needed to determine the generalizability 
of our findings. Second, several of our dependent measures comprised only a few items or even a 
single item, thus potentially raising concerns about stimulus sampling (see Wells & Windschitl, 
1999). Although we used a broad array of perspective-taking tasks in our experiments and the 
perspective-taking tasks used in Experiments 2 and 5, in particular, included a larger set of trials, 
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future research incorporating a larger variety of specific stimuli would provide additional 
reassurance for the generalizability of our findings.  
Additional Directions for Future Research 
The current work sets the stage for a number of additional directions for future research 
on emotion and mental-state reasoning. First, we focused exclusively on the effects of incidental 
emotions triggered by an unrelated prior experience. Future research should investigate whether 
specific integral emotions (i.e., those elicited by the perspective-taking target; Bodenhausen, 
1993) lead to comparable increases in egocentrism. One relevant context for exploring this 
question concerns encounters with social groups that chronically elicit feelings of anxiety 
(Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Insofar as intergroup anxiety undermines understanding of outgroup 
membersÕ thoughts, feelings, and intentions, it could be an important constraint on positive 
intergroup relations (Shelton & Richeson, 2006).   
Second, we found that the anxiety and surpriseÑemotions characterized by uncertaintyÑ
increased egocentrism. Future research should examine whether other emotions known to trigger 
uncertainty appraisal tendencies (e.g., hope) produce comparable effects. Future research should 
also explore whether emotions differing on other appraisal dimensions (e.g., control) 
differentially affect reliance on self-knowledge during mental-state reasoning.  
Third, our perceptual perspective-taking tasks measured spatial perspective taking, as 
participantsÕ task was to identify whether an object appeared to a target personÕs left or right. 
Future research should examine whether anxiety and other uncertainty-associated emotions also 
increase egocentric interference on visual perspective-taking tasks in which participants must 
simply identify whether another person can see an object or not (for more on the distinction 
between spatial and visual perspective taking, see Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 2013).  
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Fourth, mental-state reasoning likely recruits both domain-specific and domain-general 
cognitive processes (Zaki, Hennigan, Weber, & Ochsner, 2010), and there is debate about the 
unique contributions of these processes on perspective-taking task performance (Apperly, 
Samson, & Humphreys, 2005; Heyes, 2014; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). Although the 
results of Experiment 2 were not explained by differences in mental-rotation ability, given the 
established link between anxiety and diminished executive functioning (Eysenck et al., 2007), 
future research should test whether anxiety and other uncertainty-associated emotions impede 
performance on a non-social, albeit similarly cognitively demanding, version of our perceptual 
perspective-taking task (e.g., Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird, & Heyes, 2013).  
Finally, on each of our perspective-taking tasks, participantsÕ own mental states directly 
conflicted with those of the target person(s); thus, ÒoptimalÓ performance entailed resisting 
interference from oneÕs own perspective when inferring the targetsÕ differing mental states. 
Future research should examine whether anxiety and other uncertainty-associated emotions also 
hinder performance on perspective-taking tasks in which a targetÕs mental states are not in direct 
conflict with participantsÕ own (e.g., Hppe, 1994) or tasks in which egocentric interference is 
minimal (e.g., reality-unknown false-belief tasks; Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 
2004). Relatedly, according to anchoring-and-adjustment accounts of mental-state inference 
(Epley et al., 2004; Tamir & Mitchell, 2013), perspective taking entails a process of anchoring 
on oneÕs own perspective followed by an adjustment for potential differences between the target 
and oneself (see also Todd et al., 2011). Because it is unclear from our experiments at which 
stage incidental emotions are operating and because appraisal tendencies can influence both the 
content of judgment and the process by which accessible content is transformed into judgment 
(Han et al., 2007), future research should explore whether anxiety and other uncertainty-
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associated emotions alter the extent of ÒanchoringÓ on accessible self-knowledge, the extent of 
ÒadjustmentÓ away from accessible self-knowledge, or both.  
Conclusion 
Although much is known about the influence of incidental emotions on judgment and 
behavior, relatively little is known about whether and how they shape processes involved in 
mental-state reasoning. Our findings provide the first causal evidence that the uncertainty 
appraisal tendencies accompanying anxiety can increase reliance on egocentric self-knowledge 
when trying to understand othersÕ differing perceptual and conceptual perspectives. 
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1 Across experiments, preliminary analyses revealed no moderation by participant gender. 
2 Other trimming procedures (e.g., discarding RTs >2.5 or 3 SDs from the grand mean) 
produced nearly identical results. All contrasts involving anxiety on processing cost on the 
ÔotherÕ trials remained significant (ps<.015). 
3 Although we conducted analyses using log-transformed data, we report untransformed 
means for ease of interpretation; analyses on untransformed data produced nearly identical 
results.  
4 Additional analyses using reported ability to predict what would happen next in the 
recalled event across participants as the predictor revealed no significant relationship between 
this variable and errors on either the false-belief or the control scenarios (ps>.68). 
5 An additional mediation analysis that isolated anxiety (0=anger and pride combined, 
1=anxiety) produced nearly identical results; the indirect path through uncertainty was 
significant (b=.010, SE=.006; 95% CI [.001, .024]). 
 





Experienced emotions by incidental emotion condition (Experiments 1, 2, 3, & 5) 
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Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses; within each row, means with different subscripts 
significantly differ (p<.05).   





Processing cost on ÔotherÕ trials and ÔselfÕ trials by incidental emotion condition (Experiment 2) 
 
  




































Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses; within each row, means with different subscripts 
significantly differ (p<.01).   
 
  





Figure 1. Examples of stimuli used on the ÔselfÕ trials (left panel) and ÔotherÕ trials (right panel) 
in the speeded spatial perspective-taking task (Experiment 2).   
 




Figure 2. Mean processing cost on the ÔotherÕ trials and the ÔselfÕ trials by incidental emotion 
condition; error bars depict standard errors (Experiment 2). 
 
 




Figure 3. Mean sincerity judgments on the privileged-knowledge and shared-knowledge 
scenarios by incidental emotion condition; error bars depict standard errors (Experiment 3). 




Figure 4. Mean sincerity judgments on the privileged-knowledge and shared-knowledge 
scenarios by certainty appraisal condition; error bars depict standard errors (Experiment 4B). 
 




Figure 5. Mean proportion of errors on false-belief and control scenarios by emotion certainty 
condition; error bars depict standard errors (Experiment 5).  
 







Figure 6. Mediational model wherein uncertainty appraisal tendencies underlie the effect of 
emotion certainty condition on the proportion of errors on the false-belief scenarios. Numbers 
represent standardized regression coefficients; numbers in parentheses represent simultaneous 
regression coefficients (Experiment 5). 
Emotion Certainty 
0 = Certainty-associated 
(anger, pride) 







* (.12*)  
.12* (.10ns) Proportion of 
Errors on False-
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Rationale for Exclusion Criteria 
Because of the language demands of several of the perspective-taking tasks used in this 
research, we decided a priori not to analyze data for non-native speakers. Although we did not 
preclude non-native speakers from participating, we only analyzed data for native English 
speakers in Experiments 1, 3, 4A, 4B, and 5, and native German speakers in Experiment 2.  
We also decided a priori to exclude data from participants whose responses suggested 
inattention and participants who expressed suspicion regarding the experimental hypotheses. We 
classified participants as inattentive if they spent <30 sec on the autobiographical recall emotion 
inductions used across experiments or <5 sec on the conceptual perspective-taking task used in 
Experiments 3 and 4B. We classified participants as suspicious if they articulated a causal 
relationship between the emotion induction and the focal dependent measure. Although we were 
primarily concerned about suspicion in experiments in which the purpose of the perspective-
taking task was relatively transparent and performance was easily alterable, we decided to 
impose a similar suspicion exclusion rule across experiments. Suspicion was generally low 
across experiments; we suspect that it was higher among MTurk users because of their greater 
experience with experiments (particularly autobiographical recall emotion inductions), relative to 
college students (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolucci, 2014). Analyses including these participantsÕ 
data are reported in Table Appendix A. 
Additionally, in Experiment 1, we excluded data from participants who provided 
unscorable location descriptions on the spatial perspective-taking task (e.g., Òat the topÓ). 
Finally, in Experiment 3, we excluded data from participants who had invalid responses on 
>30% of the trials on the speeded spatial perspective-taking task. Invalid responses consisted of 
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errors and RTs greater than 2000 ms. We selected the 30% threshold somewhat arbitrarily, using 
prior research as a guide (e.g., Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003); analyses using a more 
lenient criterion (40%) yielded nearly identical results. 
Appendix B 
Sample Size Determination 
We determined our sample size in Experiment 1 based on our own prior work (Todd et 
al., 2011; Todd & Galinsky, 2012) using Tversky and HardÕs (2009) spatial perspective-taking 
task and an a priori heuristic of at least 40 participants per cell. Post-hoc power for the critical 
contrasts in Experiment 1 fell short of 80% (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007); thus, to 
increase a priori power in our subsequent experiments, we increased our target sample sizes to at 
least 50 participants per cell in Experiment 2 and at least 60 participants per cell in Experiments 
3Ð5. In all experiments, data were collected until this target number was reached or surpassed. 
Appendix C 
Spatial Perspective-Taking Task Filler Questions (Experiment 1) 
 The filler questions used in the spatial perspective-taking task (Tversky & Hard, 2009) 
from Experiment 1 appear below. We presented all questions in an open-ended format. The 
critical question that served as our dependent measure appeared after the fourth question. 
1. How would you judge the brightness of this photo? 
2. How would you judge the clarity of this photo? 
3. How would you judge the overall quality of this photo? 
4. How old do you think the person is? 
5. How many picture frames are in the room? 
6. How many chairs are in the room? 
 
Appendix D 
Message Interpretation Task (Experiments 3 and 4B) 
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The scenarios used in the message interpretation task (Keysar, 1994) from Experiments 3 
and 4B appear below. Wording for the privileged information in the privileged-knowledge 
versions appears in bold; wording for the shared-knowledge versions appears in brackets. For 
both scenarios, participants answered the following question (1=very sarcastic, 7=very sincere): 
ÒHow do you think Nick interprets DavidÕs e-mail?Ó 
Scenario 1 
David needs some cash for a high school dance. He decides to look after the dog of his best 
friend and neighbor, Nick, for a long weekend. As Nick gives David instructions, he adds, 
ÒDamian is a wonderful dog. HeÕll be great company for you.Ó David loves animals and all 
weekend long he exhausts himself trying every trick he knows to play with Damian, but 
Damian is unresponsive, preferring to play with his chew toys alone. [David has a lot of 
work to do this weekend and is glad that Damian is happy sleeping or playing with his chew toys 
alone.] Since he has to leave for an appointment an hour before Nick is due back, David sends 
him an e-mail to which he adds, ÒWonderful dog. And heÕs such great company.Ó 
 
Scenario 2 
Before David knew it, his first college summer had passed, and the day to choose his sophomore 
classes had come. Nick, now a freshman at the same college, is curious about one of the 
professors. He decides to write David an e-mail which asks, ÒHow is Jones as a professor? Is he 
a nice guy?Ó As it turns out, David knows the professor because he had taken his class. 
However, he hadnÕt gotten along with the professor because the professor had been rude to 
him. [As it turns out, David had taken the professorÕs class the previous year and had gotten 
along with him very well.] With that in mind, he immediately responds by writing back, ÒOh 
yeah, Professor Jones is a real nice guy.Ó 
 
Appendix E 
False-Belief Task (Experiment 5) 
 The scenarios for the false-belief task (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) used in Experiment 5 
appear below. Participants selected one of the two response options (in parentheses) to complete 
the sentence following each scenario.  
False-Belief Scenarios 
1. Jenny put her chocolate away in the cupboard. Then she went outside. Alan moved the 
chocolate from the cupboard into the fridge. Half an hour later, Jenny came back inside.  




Jenny expects to find her chocolate in the _____.  (cupboard, fridge) 
 
2. Anne made lasagna in the blue dish. After Anne left, Ian came home and ate the lasagna. 
Then he filled the blue dish with spaghetti and replaced it in the fridge. 
 
Anne thinks the blue dish contains _____.   (lasagna, spaghetti) 
 
3. When Lisa left Jacob he was deep asleep on the beach. A few minutes later a huge wave 
woke him. Seeing Lisa was gone Jacob decided to go swimming.  
 
Lisa now believes that Jacob is _____.   (swimming, sleeping) 
 
4. The girls left ice cream in the freezer before they went to sleep. Overnight the power to the 
kitchen was cut and the ice cream melted.  
 
When they get up the girls believe the ice cream is _____. (melted, frozen) 
 
5. Toby has always liked the snack food called ÔgoldfishÕ. He asked his mother to buy some 
goldfish when she went to the supermarket. TobyÕs mother came home with real pet fish.  
 
TobyÕs mom thought that Toby wanted _____.  (real fish, snack food) 
 
6. David knows that Ethan is very scared of spiders. Ethan, alone in the attic, sees a shadow 
move and thinks it is a burglar. David hears Ethan cry for help. 
 
David assumes that Ethan thinks he has seen a _____. (burglar, spider) 
 
Control Scenarios 
1. Jason is wearing blue jeans, white running shoes, a grey scarf, and matching sweater. He has 
thick glasses on his long hooked nose and a long blond beard on his chin. 
 
The scarf Jason is wearing is _____.    (blue, grey) 
 
2. Emily was always the tallest kid in her class. In kindergarten she was already over 4 feet tall. 
Now that she is in college she is 6Õ4Ó. She is a head taller than the others. 
 
In kindergarten Emily was over _____ tall.   (4 ft., 6 ft.) 
 
3. Harry looks just like a math professor. He wears dark old cardigans with holes in the elbows, 
corduroy trousers, and brown loafers over green argyle socks. 
 
The shoes Harry wears are _____.    (brown, green) 
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4. DinaÕs hair is long and wild. It runs in black curls all the way down her back and gets caught 
in her belt and her brown back pack, and in other peopleÕs buckles. 
 
The color of DinaÕs hair is _____.    (black, brown) 
 
5. Christine is much too thin. Her knee bones stand out from her legs and her knuckles are 
swollen like an old womanÕs. Only her smooth cheeks show that Christine is still a teenager. 
 
Because she is thin, ChristineÕs _____ are swollen.  (knees, knuckles) 
 
6. Each girl wears her uniform slightly differently. Blair wears her shirt untucked. Annette 
leaves one button undone, and refuses to pull up her knee socks to regulation height. 
 
Annette wears her uniform shirt _____.   (unbuttoned, untucked) 
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Table Appendix A 
 
p-values of key experimental effects involving anxiety before and after applying exclusion 
criteria (Experiments 2, 3, 4A, 4B, and 5) 
 
  Exclusion Criterion 
  Suspicion Inattention 
Outcome variables/Hypothesis tests pafter nexcluded pbefore nexcluded pbefore 
 
Egocentric processing cost (Experiment 2) 
   Anxiety vs. anger contrast 
   Anxiety vs. disgust contrast 
   Anxiety vs. neutral contrast 
    
Processing cost on ÔotherÕ trials (Experiment 2) 
   Anxiety vs. anger contrast 
   Anxiety vs. disgust contrast 
   Anxiety vs. neutral contrast 
 
Sincerity ratings (Experiment 3) 
   Emotion × scenario interaction 
   Simple effect of anxiety on privileged- 
      knowledge scenarios 
   
Uncertainty ratings (Experiment 4A) 
   Anxiety vs. anger contrast 
   Anxiety vs. disgust contrast 
   Anxiety vs. neutral contrast 
 
Sincerity ratings (Experiment 4B) 
   Certainty × scenario interaction 
   Simple effect of uncertainty on  
      privileged-knowledge scenarios 
 
Errors (Experiment 5) 
   Certainty × scenario interaction 
   Simple effect of uncertainty-associated  













































































































































Note. pafter = p-value after applying both exclusion criteria (these values are identical to what 
appears in main text); nexcluded = number of participants excluded based on each exclusion 
criterion; pbefore = p-value before applying each exclusion criterion individually. 




Additional Variables Collected (Experiment 2) 
 In Experiment 2, participants in the neutral condition also completed the spatial 
perspective-taking task from Experiment 1 (Tversky & Hard, 2009) and a German version 
(Paulus, 2009) of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). The IRI is a well-
validated measure of dispositional empathy consisting of four subscales: perspective taking (PT: 
α=.74), empathic concern (EC: α=.70), personal distress (PD: α=.60), and fantasy (FS: α=.67). 
We included these items to examine their relationship with our novel, speeded spatial 
perspective-taking task. Correlational analyses revealed that egocentric processing cost on the 
speeded spatial perspective-taking task was positively correlated with the likelihood of providing 
an egocentric response on the Tversky and Hard task (r[58]= .25, p=.062) and was negatively 
correlated with each of the IRI subscales, though none of these correlations reached significance 
(rs[58]=-.16, -.15, -.08, & -.20; ps=.24, .27, .54, & .14, for PT, EC, PD, & FS, respectively).  
Additional Analyses (Experiment 2) 
 Decomposing the processing cost index described in the main text for the speeded spatial 
perspective-taking task in Experiment 2, we report separate analyses for error rates and response 
times (RTs) on the ÔotherÕ trials and the ÔselfÕ trials. For each analysis, we report the results of 
the same three contrasts reported in the main text: anxiety versus anger, anxiety versus disgust, 
and anxiety versus neutral (see Table S1 for all Ms and SDs).  
Error Rates 
 ÔOtherÕ trials. As predicted, anxious participants made more errors on the ÔotherÕ trials 
than did angry (Contrast 1: t[225]=2.04, p=.043, d=0.27), disgusted (Contrast 2: t[225]=2.97, 
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p=.003, d=0.40), and neutral participants (Contrast 3: t[225]=2.24, p=.026, d=0.30). The latter 
three conditions did not significantly differ from one another (|t|s<1, ps>.39, |d|s<0.12). 
 ÔSelfÕ trials. None of the three anxiety-related contrasts on the ÔselfÕ trial errors was 
statistically significant (|t|s<1, ps>.47, |d|s<0.10), nor were there any significant differences 
among the anger, disgust, and neutral conditions (|t|s<1.01, ps>.31, |d|s<0.14). 
RTs 
 ÔOtherÕ trials. Mirroring the error rate analyses, analyses of the log-transformed RTs on 
the ÔotherÕ trials revealed that anxious participants responded more slowly than did angry 
(Contrast 1: t[225]=1.54, p=.126, d=0.21), disgusted (Contrast 2: t[225]=1.38, p=.170, d=0.18), 
and neutral participants (Contrast 3: t[225]=1.42, p=.156, d=0.19), though none of these 
contrasts was statistically reliable. Once again, the latter three conditions did not differ from one 
another (|t|s<1, ps>.82, |d|s<0.03).  
 ÔSelfÕ trials. None of the three anxiety-related contrasts on the ÔselfÕ trial RTs was 
statistically significant (|t|s<1, ps>.42, |d|s<0.11), nor were there any significant differences 
among the anger, disgust, and neutral conditions (|t|s<1, ps>.73, |d|s<0.05). 
Meta-Analytic Tests Involving Self-Focused Attention (Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5) 
 In examining the role of self-focused attention in explaining the effects of incidental 
anxiety on egocentric mental-state reasoning, we conducted two sets of meta-analyses. In the 
first meta-analysis, we tested the effect of anxiety on proportion of first-person singular pronouns 
in participantsÕ autobiographical recall essays. In the second meta-analysis, we tested the 
relationship between first-person pronoun usage and perspective taking.  
Effect of Anxiety on Self-Focused Attention 
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In Experiment 1, anxious participants (M=12.17%, SD=3.24) used a marginally greater 
proportion of first-person pronouns than did angry (M=10.81%, SD=2.81) and neutral 
participants (M=11.64%, SD=3.23) combined, t(132)=1.70, p=.092, d=0.30. In Experiment 2, 
anxious participants (M=11.03%, SD=3.66) used a significantly greater proportion of first-person 
pronouns than did angry (M=9.51%, SD=3.76) and disgusted participants (M=8.99%, SD=4.19) 
combined, t(168)=2.80, p=.006, d=0.43. In Experiment 3, anxious (M=10.90%, SD=3.80) and 
angry participants (M=11.53%, SD=5.38) did not differ in their first-person pronoun usage (t<1, 
p=.84, d=-0.14). Finally, in Experiment 5, anxious (M=11.13%, SD=4.23) and angry participants 
(M=10.98%, SD=4.38) did not differ in their first-person pronoun usage (t<1, p=.84, d=0.04).  
To obtain a more precise estimate of the magnitude of the effect of anxiety on self-focus, 
we calculated meta-analytic ds by weighing the d from each experiment by the inverse of its 
variance, and we calculated meta-analytic SEs by taking the square root of the reciprocal of the 
sum of the weights. We then divided the meta-analytic d by the meta-analytic SE, yielding a Z 
statistic (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). As reported in the main text, this analysis revealed that, 
overall, anxiety significantly increased self-focused attention (d=.35, Z=4.04, p<.001).  
Self-Focused Attention Predicting Egocentrism 
Self-focused attention did not significantly predict egocentric location descriptions in 
Experiment 1 (b=1.00, SE=5.58, Wald<1, p=.86), processing cost on the ÔotherÕ trials in 
Experiment 2 (b=1.16, SE=1.34, β=.066, t<1, p=.39), sincerity judgments on the privileged-
knowledge scenarios in Experiment 3 (b=-.35, SE=3.20, β=-.009, t<1, p=.91), or false-belief 
errors in Experiment 5 (b=.005, SE=.004, β=.107, t=1.28, p=.20). Consequently, we did not 
conduct any formal tests of mediation in any of the individual experiments.  
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Nevertheless, to obtain a more precise estimate of the relationship between self-focused 
attention and perspective taking, we calculated meta-analytic βs and SEs by weighing the β from 
each experiment by the inverse of its variance, and we calculated meta-analytic SEs by taking the 
square root of the reciprocal of the sum of the weights. We then divided the meta-analytic β by 
the meta-analytic SE, yielding a Z statistic (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). As reported in the main 
text, this analysis revealed that, overall, self-focused attention did not significantly predict 










Response times and error rates on the ÔotherÕ trials and ÔselfÕ trials by incidental emotion 
condition (Experiment 2) 
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Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses; within each row, means with different subscripts 
significantly differ (p<.05).   
 
